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S. 2155 of the Eighty-Ninth
Congress- The Criminal Injuries
Compensation Act
Ralph W. Yarborough*
The idea is so simple and just that its novelty makes less of a
first impression than the regret that the idea has not been previ-
ously adopted. Seemingly compensation by the state to those in-
jured by criminals should have been a popular topic of discussion
in law and political science. Yet neither cryptic sentences in the
Code of Hammurabi nor Bentham's suggestions inspired any
predicate of scholarly or public debate in American circles until
very recently.' Last year the adoption of plans for compensation
to victims of crime in Great Britain and New Zealand as well as
provocative speeches by then-Justice Arthur Goldberg stimulated
consideration of the idea in legal journals and the public press.2
In the spring of 1964, scattered newspaper references to pro-
posals for compensating victims of crime revived my interest in
the anomaly of our concern for criminals and victims, an interest
originally formed when I sat on the criminal bench. I advocated
adoption of a victim's compensation plan in a speech to the Texas
Plaintiff's Attorneys Association in July 1964, and resolved to
introduce appropriate legislation in the U.S. Senate. My bill was
introduced on June 17, 1965, and is numbered S. 2155 of the 89th
Congress, 1st Sess.3 This article is a short account of the problems
*United States Senator from Texas.
1. Aside from press references to the actions in Great Britain and New
Zealand, little scholarly treatment of the subject can be found in the more
widely circulated journals other than Childres, The Victims, Harpers Magazine,
April, 1964, p. 159. Professor Childres provides a thorough review of the litera-
ture in his fine article, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury,
89 N.Y.U,. 11Ev. 444 (1964), and I have drawn heavily on his work. For
discussion of the early history of the idea see Wolfgang, Victim Compensation
in Crimes of Personal Violence, 50 Mm. L. RIv. 293 (1965).
2. Ambassador Goldberg's speech will be found reprinted at 89 N.Y.U.L.
11Ev. 205 (1964). For a typical press report of his advocacy see New York
Times, March 25, 1964, p. 18, col. -0.
3. [Hereinafter cited to section number only.] Similar bills have since been
introduced in the House of Representatives by Congresswoman Edith Green,
H.R. 11818, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Congressman William D. Hathaway,
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encountered and the choices made in reducing the humanitarian
concept to the language of a proposed statute.'
The starting point in advancing a specific proposal is a con-
sideration of the means used by our laws to redress losses suffered
by persons without fault as a result of wrongdoers' acts. The com-
mon law provides a right to bring a civil action against a crimi-
nal, but this is a notoriously empty right. The efficacy of this
right may be improved by remedial legislation. However, it is
difficult to see how legislation could make this right produce ade-
quate compensation so long as claims must be asserted against
an individual criminal, who must be caught, identified, and found
capable of satisfying a judgment. A proposal that the state guar-
antee payment of civil judgments based on criminal wrongdoing
is not adequate as it would not cover the many cases where the
victim cannot find or identify the criminal.
If we feel that criminally inflicted injury should be compen-
sated, social legislation seems to assure the fullest equity to all
victims. Legislation establishing classes of individuals to whom
a responsibility is owed is already quite common: injured work-
men get workmen's compensation, disabled veterans get veterans'
compensation, the aged get subsistence, and now hospital insur-
ance from the Social Security program. Our modern industrial
democracy accepts the idea of compensating needy members of a
particular class. And here there is a direct relation between the
class needing compensation and the recoguized duty of the state
to protect its citizens from criminal action. In view of the many
social welfare programs that are in operation, the failure to recog-
nize the special claims of this group seems to be a gross oversight.5
It is preferable to think of this proposal in terms of a social
welfare program rather than as one establishing a true legal right.
Giving a victim a court enforceable right of action against the
government, as is done under the Federal Tort Claims Act, would
have several undesirable consequences. I feel it would be better to
H.R. 11552, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Spark M. Matsunaga, H.R. 11291,
89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965); Jonathan B. Bingham, H.R. 11211, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965); George E. Brown, Jr., H.R. 10896, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
4. Mr. A. Blair Crownover, Assistant Senate Legislative Counsel, and Dr.
Thomas P. Jahnlige, now of the faculty of Smith College, Northampton,
Massachusetts, collaborated in the work which made introduction of the bill
possible.
5. The class for which compensation is sought is composed of victims who
have suffered personal injuries from intentional acts categorized as criminal,
as developed below. The greater state duty to this class will hopefully prevent
involvement of this proposal in any debate over changing the present system
of compensation for negligently inflicted injuries.
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separate the dispensation of criminal justice and the compensation
of victims of crime. In compensating the victims, we do not want
the criminal guilt of the defendant to be an issue. We do not need
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that this criminal committed
this crime, we want only a preponderance of the evidence that this
victim suffered these losses from a criminal action. Judges should
not be asked to alternate these essentially different approaches in
the same fact situation.6
California, first of our jurisdictions to recognize the responsi-
bility of the state to victims of crime, has integrated its victim
compensation system closely into its state welfare program.7 After
the conviction of the perpetrator of a crime of violence resulting
in injury or death, a needy victim or surviving family may apply
for payments under the standards used in the California Aid to
Dependent Children program. In simplicity and probably in
economy, this approach should recommend itself to many other
states. Its adoption is to be applauded.
However, the California plan has two defects. The first is a
requirement of a conviction prior to eligibility for aid. Although
administratively convenient, requiring a conviction is irrelevant
to the victim's loss and need. Secondly, only the victim's present
needs are met. This does not necessarily reflect the full loss that
the victim may have suffered from the criminal action.
What is desired is a forum which can determine the identity of
the victim, his loss, its causation by criminal action, and an appro-
priate award. Characteristics of the proceeding should be accessi-
bility, simplicity, speed, accuracy, and finality. The recent enact-
ments of New Zealand and Great Britain seek to attain these
goals through an independent administrative tribunal, and this
path seems the most promising.
Great Britain established such a tribunal on August 1, 1964.8
Although for several years Great Britain seems to have led the
active discussion of compensation for victims of crime, New Zea-
land first enacted such a statute, effective January 1, 1964.' The
programs of the two countries are alike in conception since both
6. Especially consider the plight of the government's trial attorneys, who
one day would be prosecuting a criminal, the next day contesting the victim-
plaintiff's proof of the crime.
7. CAL. STAT. ch. 1549, which adds §§ 1500.02 and 11211 to the Code.
See Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 50 A-Nx.
L. Rnv. 271 (1965).
8. Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence, C mD. No. 2828
(1964) [hereinafter referred to as the BRITISH WHE PAPER].
9. Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1963, 1 NEw ZEAA~im STAT. No.
134 (1963).
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are rooted in the common law. Thus, a similar plan should be
adaptable to American needs.
Because the New Zealand statute is stated with greater speci-
ficity and in a form more familiar to American legislators, it was
used as the model in drafting S. 2155. As will be seen from the
discussion below, some modifications of the New Zealand statute
have been adopted. Some precedents from applicable American
statutes were employed in a few instances, the author's independ-
ent judgment was asserted. Admittedly, the bill was drafted with
an eye to its Congressional acceptability; "limits" and "safe-
guards" were preferred over potential "open ends" and "loop-
holes."
Jurisdiction. Only cases arising in the limited areas of general
federal police power and responsibility are covered by this bill.
These areas include the "special maritime and territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States,""' and the District of Columbia. This
applies our theory, that the right of the victim to compensation
from the state arises from the failure of the state to protect from
crime. Therefore, the bill is designed to act only where there is an
existing general federal police responsibility. Although there may
be merit in the argument for a nationwide plan, practical considera-
tions urge a small scale experiment. Also, a great deal of valuable
experience may be gained from the various plans which may be
adopted by the states if the entire field is not effectively pre-
empted by federal action.
The commission. The spirit of the New Zealand statute is
followed in establishing a quasi-judicial administrative commis-
sion to adjudicate compensation claims. Modifications harmoniz-
ing the structure to the considerable body of applicable American
experience and law were adopted where desirable.
The Violent Crimes Compensation Commission would be com-
posed of three members appointed by the President to eight-year
terms. The eight-year term, while slightly longer than the usual
term on an administrative board, might be subject to question on
the ground that it does not insure the judicial independence pre-
sumed to flow from life appointments. The shorter term seems
appropriate for this new commission, however, to add needed
flexibility. A feature adopted from the New Zealand statute is
the requirement that the member designated as chairman shall
10. 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1964). The author admits an avoidance of discussion of
the extent and complexity of the federal jurisdiction under this section.
[Vol. 50:255
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have been a lawyer for eight years. This assures the preservation
of the essence of legal form under a lawyer chairman, but thus
signals that legal experience is not a requirement for the other
members. It may well be that very suitable individuals not legally
trained will be found - a doctor, for example - but we may
expect a tendency for the commission to be composed exclusively
of lawyers. The chairman of the commission is placed in the same
executive salary class as the chairmen of other independent agen-
cies (e.g., Federal Communications Commission, National Media-
tion Board, etc.); the other members, like the members of those
other bodies, rank somewhat below the financial status of federal
district judges, but probably as high in the federal hierarchy as
presently can be justified to a skeptical Congress.
Section 201(c) is borrowed from New Zealand and is possibly
novel to our laws.2 The chairman and one member constitute a
quorum, but if their opinion is divided, the chairman's opinion
prevails. Although probably reflected in existing administrative
practice, setting the rule by statute has the virtue of definiteness.
The commission is given the customary powers to incur ex-
penses and hire employees, including examiners. Its principal office
is established in Washington, D.C.; the bulk of its business prob-
ably will originate there. The commission may compel the appear-
ance of witnesses and documents. Subject to the specific provisions
of the act, the commission is given broad powers to issue regula-
tions governing its proceedings and is made subject to the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.
Commission procedure. The proposed statute directs the com-
mission not to apply strict legal rules of evidence. Section 205(h)
authorizes receiving any matter in evidence, whether or not it
would be admissible in a court of law. The anticipated legal ex-
perience of the commissioners will enable them to weigh the
revelance and probative value of the evidence offered, and to use
the rules of evidence as a background rather than as a screen.
This provision is taken from the New Zealand statute and is
similar to the practice of other federal administrative bodies. A
rule of evidence set by the statute' 3 accepts proof of a final crimi-
nal conviction of a crime as conclusive that the offense was com-
11. Section 901(a). 1 NEW ZEAL"D STAT. No. 134 § 4(2) (1963), requires
the chairman of the Crimes Compensation Tribunal to have been a lawyer for
not less than seven years.
12. 1 NEw ZEALAm STAT. No. 134 § 11 (1963).
13. Section 205(i).
1965] 259
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mitted. In addition to being a convenience to the commission,
this provision would prevent collateral attack on the finality of
criminal convictions.
Omitted from S. 2155 are the provisions of the New Zealand
statute authorizing hearings in private and authorizing the prohi-
bition of publication of the name of the victim or of the offender.
The absence of these provisions should not be construed to mean
that the problem of avoiding noxious publicity to applicants and
witnesses may not be dealt with by the commission. The New
Zealand language was omitted because it would raise first
amendment problems. However, we may expect the commission
to adopt practices consistent with the Administrative Procedure
Act to preserve some degree of privacy in appropriate cases.
Upon receiving an application the commission is required to
set a time and place for a hearing. This provision, taken from the
New Zealand statute, should be considered critically. Since S. 2155
does not set a minimum monetary figure for applications, claims
for quite small sums may be expected. Administrative convenience
might be served if small claims could be settled without a hearing,
with the applicant granted a right to a hearing on appeal.
Under S. 2155, an applicant is entitled to appear and be heard
in person or through an attorney. Any attorney assisting the com-
mission is also entitled to be heard, as is any other person "who
satisfies the Commission that he has a substantial interest in
the proceedings." This latter category includes the alleged crimi-
nal. Each person entitled to appear may produce evidence and
cross-examine witnesses.14 The resulting informal inquiry between
three antagonistic parties fully preserves the benefits of the ad-
versary system.
Finality. Section 207 states that orders of the commission shall
be final. The bill does not create a right which can be litigated
in court, nor a right to a trial de novo on the facts. Our target is
to provide speedy compensation by a simple administrative pro-
ceeding. In this respect it is similar to the New Zealand and
British programs.
Attorneys' fees. Section 206(a) authorizes the commission to
allow attorneys' fees, with a maximum of fifteen per cent of an
award over one thousand dollars. This section is taken from and
may be compared with the Federal Tort Claims Act.' Many will
14. Section 205(g), written into S. 2155 is a specific warning that state-
ments given to the commission are subject to the criminal penalties for false
official statements, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1964), allowing a fee of no more than 10% of an
award over $500 which is settled before suit, and 20% if suit is filed.
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question whether this represents a sufficient fee to secure the best
representation for a victim. There is considerable informal evi-
dence that federal statutes limiting attorneys' fees have been
detrimental rather than helpful to clients seeking effective repre-
sentation. However, in view of the legislative burden of novelty
carried by the bill as a whole, prudence dictated the insertion
of this limitation.
The victim. The purpose of the proposal is to compensate vic-
tims of crime for their loss from injury or death. Logically extend-
ing our theory it can be argued that the state should compensate
for any crime causing loss, including property loss. Our limited
proposal rejects such an extension beyond personal injuries; com-
pensating property loss would make the costs astronomical, and
private insurance probably protects against a great part of such
losses.'
Personal injury is defined as "actual bodily harm and includes
pregnancy and mental or nervous shock."'17 The result of the act
on the victim is determinative, not the viciousness of the crimi-
nal's act or whether the victim's person was touched. The victim
is to be compensated for expenses resulting from injury or death,
loss of earning power, pain and suffering, and any reasonable pecu-
niary loss. Dependents of a deceased may also be compensated for
pecuniary loss. Payment may be made to the victim, his parent or
guardian, or in the case of death, to his dependents.
The commission is given broad power to consider any relevant
circumstances, including particularly any behavior of the victim
which contributed to the injury. It is preferable to grant this
power rather than attempt any special statutory caution or dis-
tinction in, say, sexual offences as is done in the British White
Paper.8 No doubt there are whole classes of cases where the com-
mission will be justified in taking an especially skeptical approach,
but it is better to leave the criteria to the judgment of the com-
mission rather than attempt to write any special safeguards.
S. 9155 provides that an application must be filed with the
commission within two years. The New Zealand plan requires
application within one year except in special circumstances. 19 The
British White Paper requires application as soon as possible, but
the Board will entertain applications only where the circum-
16. See Starrs, Private Isurance for Victime of Crime, 50 Mmm. L. REv.
285 (1965).
17. Section 109(4).
18. See BaRrm,, Wmm PAPER § 16.
19. 1 NEw ZE&LAza STAT. No. 184 §17(4) (1963).
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stances were reported to the police without delayY° Of course, the
diligence with which the victim makes an outcry and pursues his
remedies is evidentiary on the facts of the injury and the degree of
loss suffered. However, a lapse of time prior to application should
not operate as a complete bar to recovery. A two year statute of
limitations seems reasonable. It is preferable to rely on the pru-
dence of the commission to assess the meaning of delays rather
than to fix a rigid statute of limitations.
The victim will be barred from recovery if he is a relative of
the offender or a member of his householdY 1 This provision has
been taken from the New Zealand statute, perhaps too uncritically.
Most would agree that we should avoid involving the commission
in awarding compensation for husband-wife and parent-child in-
juries. But since "relatives" in the statute includes grandparents
and spouse's parents,2 the proposal may be too strict in barring
otherwise justified awards. Further consideration might lead to a
retention of the ban on awards to members of the household and
a modification allowing other relatives to recover if no part of the
award will ultimately benefit the offender or his interests.
The criminal. An award to a victim may be made whether or
not any person is ever prosecuted or convicted of a crime. Further,
there need not even be a criminal; a person's acts may be deemed
criminal for compensation purposes although by reason of age or
insanity he cannot be classified as a criminal since he is incapable
of formulating criminal intent. This is a necessary provision since
we do not want the victim's compensation for loss to be deter-
mined by such irrelevant factors. As far as the victim is con-
cerned the behavior causing the loss was criminal irrespective of
the view of the act taken by criminal law.
As noted above, a criminal conviction will be conclusive on the
commission that an offense has occurred. Perhaps more often the
commission may be requested to act on an application before the
prosecution has occurred. Following the New Zealand example,
our proposal provides that the Attorney General of the United
States may ask for a suspension of the commission proceedings
for an appropriate period if a prosecution has commenced or is
imminent.23 Clearly the prosecutors should have this power, but
it is an oversight not to insure the right of the accused criminal to
also apply for suspension of the commission proceedings. It is
20. See BRITISH WHITE PAPER § 23.
21. Section 304(c).
22. Section 102(5).
23. Section 301(f).
[Vol. 50:255
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obviously prejudicial to the defendent if the fact of an award to
the victim is publicized immediately before the criminal trial.
Also, it seems desirable to consider an exclusionary rule barring
reference to proceedings before the commission in the criminal
trial. Any hint of a commission award could be extremely preju-
dicial to the accused and should thus be excluded.
The offenses. Before making an award the commission must
find that the injury or death resulted from a criminal act. The
criminal acts compensable under S. 2155 are listed by offenses as
is done in the New Zealand statute. The list is derived from the
District of Columbia Code and the United States Code, and
attempts to include every type of violent crime that might result
in compensable injury. There is obvious danger in such lists.
Criminal acts resulting in injury should entitle a victim to com-
pensation whether or not the draftsman included every crime
that might result in injury. However, we presume that any type
of crime producing a personal injury is included as an assault, and
that classification would entitle the victim to an award.
Some may question including for compensation those offenses
involving lewd, indecent or obscene acts. If, for example, such
acts produced extreme mental and nervous shock in an elderly
lady of tender sensibilities the commission should be authorized
to exercise its compassionate discretion.
The British White Paper makes special note that injuries
caused by motor vehicles are not covered, except where the vehicle
is used as a weapon. Although this limitation is not specified in
S. 2155, the same result is expected.
The compensation. The commission has discretion to look at
all circumstances necessary to determine appropriate compensa-
tion for a victim, including his insurance reimbursements. Section
305(b) mandates the commission to deduct from its award any
amount received by the victim from the offender or from any
person on behalf of the offender (e.g., a liability insurer). Also,
any payments received from the United States, a State or sub-
division as a result of the crime must be deducted. Thus, a murder
victim's children who receive social security survivors' benefits
would find the social security payments deducted from the com-
pensation award. S. 2155 purports to establish a special system
of compensation for loss - the Government should not be in the
position of paying twice for the same loss. It may be legitimately
asked whether requiring the commission to make such deductions
is needed or useful. Should it not have the latitude to make an
exception in the extraordinary case?
1965]
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The commission is given authority to sue an offender in a
United States District Court for any part of an award made
because of his crime 4 To those who would remit victims to their
civil remedies rather than set up a plan of government compensa-
tion, no doubt this provision will confirm their objections; the
victim should be the one to file suit if there is any practical pros-
pect of recovery. However, we must accept the probability that
existence of the compensation plan will reduce the incentive of
victims to bring suit. Since our purpose is relief for victims, the
Government should provide the more immediate compensation
to the victim and take over the civil action against the criminal.
It is doubtful that many civil suits against the criminal will ap-
pear worth the plaintiff's time and effort, whether he be the
victim or Government?5
Authority is given under S. 2155 for the commission to make
the payment on such terms as it deems appropriate. It is con-
templated that the normal award would be in the form of a lump
sum payment (Great Britain so requires), but there should be
flexibility to make periodic payments, or part payments pending
final ascertainment of the total losses.
Maximum and minimum compensation. S. 2155 limits a com-
pensation payment to 25,000 dollars.2 Great Britain imposes no
overall limit, but restricts the maximum awarded for loss of earn-
ings and earning capacity to twice the average industrial wage?
7
New Zealand has limits on the various categories of compensation
and imposes an overall maximum of roughly 10,080 dollars. 8 Of
course, the maximum 25,000 dollars will be inadequate in many
cases, but it seems a reasonable figure that will avoid great ex-
penditures while experience is gained under the program.
Great Britain's scheme compensates only those suffering an
appreciable degree of injury, which is stated as being three weeks
loss of earnings or 50 pounds.?9 S. 2155, like New Zealand's plan,
sets no minimum. This represents a better policy, for to many
94. Section 401(a).
25. Section 401(a) of S. 2155 allows suit against the offender only after his
conviction. To allow suit against an offender who was not convicted approaches
governmental oppression of the accused. The victim could still bring civil
suit, however, the Government would have a right to recover from his proceeds.
26. The present wording of § 801(b) is unclear. Subsequent drafts will
specify that the limit applies to each victim and his dependents.
27. BRrrisH Wmrr PAPER § 22(a).
28. 1 Nuw ZzALAM STAT. No. 184 § 19(3) (1968).
29. BlRisH WHITE PAPER § 22(a).
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victims, a small out of pocket loss can represent a very large per-
centage of monthly income. A jurisdictional minimum would also
tempt victims to exaggerate their loss. However, as noted above,
the commission procedure probably should be modified to allow
simpler disposition of smaller claims.
It is submitted that the above description lays out a workable
plan for compensating victims of crime in the federal jurisdiction.
Problem areas can be detected, the language can be polished and
improved, but the basic framework is sound and practical. Passage
of S. 2155 by the Congress is urged; the proposal will insure full
justice in the federal jurisdiction and provide a model for the
states.
A great deal of effort has been expended by the legal profession
in defining and protecting the rights of criminals, and justly so.
But it strikes me that we have missed the mark by not devoting
equal concern to the innocent victims of crime. It is time for work
to begin in every jurisdiction for the adoption of victims' com-
pensation statutes.
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APPENDIX
[The portions of Senator Yarborough's bill most relevant to his
discussion are reprinted below.-Ed. note.]
89TH CONGRESS- 1ST SESSION
S. 2155
A B,
To provide for the compensation of persons injured by certain criminal acts.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
DE~ns'xnoNs
SEC. 102. As used in this Act-
(1) The term "child" means an unmarried person who is under eighteen
years of age and includes a stepchild or an adopted child;
(2) The term "Commission" means the Violent Crimes Compensation Com-
mission established -by this Act;
(3) The term "dependents" means such relatives of a deceased victim as
were wholly or partially dependent upon his income at the time of his death
or would have been so dependent but for the incapacity due to the injury from
which the death resulted and shall include the child of such victim born after
his death;
(4) The term "personal injury" means actual bodily harm and includes
pregnancy and mental or nervous shock;
(5) The term "relative" means his spouse, parent, grandparent, stepfather,
stepmother, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half brother, half sister, or
spouse's parents;
(6) The term "victim" means a person who is injured or killed by any act
or omission of any other person which is within the description of any of the
offenses specified in section 302 of this Act.
TITLE I-ESTABLISHMENT OF VIOLENT CRIMES
COMPENSATION COIMSSION...
SEC. 201. (a) There is established a Violent Crimes Compensation Com-
mission which shall be composed of three members to be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, solely on the
grounds of fitness to perform the duties of the office. The President shall desig-
nate one of the members of the Commission who has been a member of the
bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a State for at least eight
years, as Chairman.
(b) No member of the Commission shall engage in any other business,
vocation, or employment.
(c) The Chairman and one other member of the Commission shall consti-
tute a quorum; and where opinion is divided and only one other member is
present, the opinion of the Chairman shall prevail.
VICTIM COMPENSATION
TERMS Aim COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS
SEC. 202. (a) The term of office of each member of the Commission taking
office after December 31, 1965, shall be eight years ....
(b) Each member of the Commission shall be eligible for reappointment....
ATTORNEYS, ExAmEms, Aim Em Pw s OF THm CozmsSioN; EXPENSES
SEC. 203. (a) The Commission is authorized to appoint such officers, attor-
neys, examiners, and other experts as may be necessary for carrying out its
functions under this Act, and the Commission may, subject to the civil service
laws, appoint such other officers and employees as are necessary ....
PRINCIAL OFFIcE
SEC. 204. (a) The principal office of the Commission shall be in or near
the District of Columbia, but the Commission or any duly authorized repre-
sentative may exercise any or all of its powers in any place.
POWERS AND PROCEDURES OF T=E COMMISSION
SEC. 205. (a) Upon an application made to the Commission under the
provisions of this Act, the Commission shall fix a time and place for a hearing
on such application and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the applicant.
(b) For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act, the Com-
mission, or any member thereof, may hold such hearings, sit and act at such
times and places, and take such testimony as the Commission or such member
may deem advisable. Any member of the Commission may administer oaths
or affirmations to witnesses appearing before the Commission or before such
member. The Commission shall have such powers of subpena and compulsion
of attendance and production of documents as are conferred upon the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission by subsection (c) of section 18 of the Act of
August 26, 1935, and the provisions of subsection (d) of such section shall be
applicable to all persons summoned by subpena or otherwise to attend or
testify or produce such documents as are described therein before the Com-
mission, except that no subpena shall be issued except under the signature
of the Chairman, and application to any court for aid in enforcing such sub-
pena may be made only by said Chairman. Subpenas shall be served by any
person designated by the said Chairman.
(c) In any case in which the person entitled to make an application is a
child, the application may be made on his behalf by any person acting as his
parent or guardian. In any case in which the person entitled to make an appli-
cation is mentally defective, the application may be made on his behalf by his
guardian or such other individual authorized to administer his estate.
(d) Where any application is made to the Commission under this Act, the
applicant, and any attorney assisting the Commission, shall be entitled to
appear and be heard.
(e) Any other person may appear and be heard who satisfies the Commission
that he has a substantial interest in the proceedings.
1965] 9.67
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(f) Where under this Act any person is entitled to appear and be heard
by the Commission, that person may appear in person or by his attorney.
(g) Every person appearing under the preceding subsections of this section
shall have the right to produce evidence and to cross-examine witnesses.
(h) The Commission may receive in evidence any statement, document, in-
formation, or matter that may in the opinion of the Commission contribute to
its functions under this Act, whether or not such statement, document, in-
formation, or matter would be admissible in a court of law.
(i) If any person has been convicted of any offense with respect to an act
or omission on which a claim under this Act is based, proof of that conviction
shall, unless an appeal against the conviction or a petition for a rehearing
or certiorari in respect of the charge is pending or a new trial or rehearing
has been ordered, be taken as conclusive evidence that the offense has been
committed.
(j) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the Administrative Procedure
Act shall apply to the proceedings of the Commission.
ATTORNEYs'FEES
SEC. 206. (a) The Commission may, as a part of any order entered under
this Act, determine and allow reasonable attorney fees, which if the award is
more than $1,000 shall not exceed 15 per centum of the amount awarded ....
FiNAIT oF DEcISION
SEC. 207. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, orders and decisions of
the Commission shall be final.
REGULATIONS
SEC. 208. In the performance of its functions, the Commission is authorized
to make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules and regulations prescrib-
ing the procedures to .be followed in the filing of applications and the proceed-
ings under this Act, and such other matters as the Commission deems appro-
priate.
TITLE II-AWARD AND PAYIENT OF COMPENSATION...
SEC. S01. (a) In any case in which a person is injured or killed by any act
or omission of any other person which is within the description of the offenses
listed in section 302 of this Act; and
(1) is within the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States" as defined in section 7 of title 18 of the United States
Code; or
(2) in the case of an offense committed within the District of Columbia,
is a violation of title 22 of the District of Columbia Code, the Commission
may, in its discretion, upon an application, order the payment of compensa-
tion in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(b) The Commission may order the payment of compensation-
(1) to or on behalf of the injured person; or
1965] VICTIM COMPENSATION 269
(2) in the case of the personal injury of the victim, where the com-
pensation is for pecuniary loss suffered or expenses incurred by any person
responsible for the maintenance of the victim, to that person; or
(3) in the case of the death of the victim, to or for the benefit of the
dependents of the deceased victim, or any one or more of such dependents.
(c) For the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to have intended
an act or omission notwithstanding that by reason of age, insanity, drunken-
ness, or otherwise he was legally incapable of forming a criminal intent.
(d) In determining whether to make an order under this section, the Com-
mission may consider any circumstances it determines to be revelant, including
the behavior of the victim which directly or indirectly contributed to his injury
or death.
(e) No order may be made under this section unless the Commission, sup-
ported by substantial evidence, finds that -
(1) such an act or omission did occur; and
(2) the injury or death resulted from such act or omission.
(f) An order may be made under this section whether or not any person
is prosecuted or convicted of any offense arising out of such act or omission.
Upon application from the Attorney General, the Commussion may suspend
proceedings under this Act for such period as it deems appropriate on the
ground that a prosecution for an offense arising out of such act or omission
has been commenced or is imminent.
SEC. 302. The Commission may order the payment of compensation in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Act for personal injury or death which
resulted from offenses in the following categories: (1) assault with intent to
kill, rob, rape, or poison; (2) assault with intent to commit mayhem; (3)
assault with a dangerous weapon; (4) mayhem; (5) malicious disfiguring;
(6) threats to do bodily harm; (7) lewd, indecent, or obscene acts; (8) indecent
act with children; (9) kidnaping; (10) murder; (11) manslaughter, voluntary;
(12) attempted murder; (13) rape; (14) attempted rape.
NATURE OF THE COMPENSATION
SEC. 303. The Commission may order the payment of compensation under
this Act for-
(a) expenses actually and reasonably incurred as a result of the per-
sonal injury or death of the victim;
(b) loss of earning power as a result of total or partial incapacity of
such victim;
(c) pecuniary loss to the dependents of the deceased victim;
(d) pain and suffering of the victim; and
(e) any other pecuniary loss resulting from the personal injury or death
of the victim which the Commission determines to be reasonable.
LIMITATIONS UPON AwARIurN COMrPENSATION
SEC. 304. (a) No order for the payment of compensation shall be made
under section 301 of this Act unless the application has been made within two
years after the date of the personal injury or death.
(b) No compensation shall be awarded under this Act in an amount in
excess of $25,000.
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(c) No compensation shall be awarded if the victim -
(1) is a relative of the offender; or
(2) was at the time of the personal injury or death of the victim living
with the offender as his wife or her husband or as a member of the offend-
er's household.
TERmS OF THE OrDER
SEC. 805. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section any order for the
payment of compensation under this Act may be made on such terms as the
Commission deems appropriate.
(b) The Commission shall deduct from any payments awarded under sec-
tion 301 of this Act any payments received by the victim or by any of his
dependents from the offender or from any person on behalf of the offender, or
from the United States (except those received under this Act), a State or any
of its subdivisions, for personal injury or death compensable under this Act.
TITLE TV-RECOVERY OF COMPENSATION
RECOVERY FROM OFFENDER
SEC. 401. (a) Whenever any person is convicted of an offense and an order
for the payment of compensation is or has been made under this Act for a
personal injury or death resulting from the act or omission constituting such
offense, the Commission may institute an action against such person for the
recovery of the whole or any specified part of such compensation in the district
court of the United States ....
